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 ABSTRACT 
We take a game theory approach to study the make-or-buy decisions of firms in a 
mixed duopoly. We assume that a managerial firm and a profit-oriented firm compete in a 
duopoly market for a final good, and they can choose whether making an intermediate input or 
buying it from a monopolistic upstream firm. We find that different equilibria may arise, 
depending on parameter constellations. In particular, if the technology used for the production 
of the intermediate input is too costly, then the internal organization of firms at equilibrium is 
mixed, creating a conflict with social preferences that would always privilege vertical 
integration to outsourcing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A wide debate is currently taking place concerning the convenience for firms of 
making or buying intermediate goods to be used as inputs in the production process. 
This issue is closely related to  choice between vertical integration and dis-integration, 
or, equivalently, with the opportunity of outsourcing. 
From a historical perspective, the evolution of capitalism is characterised by different 
phases, in each of which the tendencies to vertical integration or vertical dis-integration 
are more or less intense. Even if we confine our attention to the last decades, the 
economic development of industrialised countries over the period of the so-called 
economic boom (the Fifties and Sixties) seemed to be characterised by high incentives 
towards vertical integration. On the opposite, the Eighties witnessed a strong tendency 
to dis-integration, often interpreted as a way to increase flexibility (see Tadelis, 2002, 
inter alia). What is happening today, in the years of (the third wave of) “globalisation” 
is not clear, and this is reflected by a large literature discussing the various aspects of 
this issue over the last twenty years.1  
According to Grossman and Hart (1986), the failure of the internal incentive system, 
due to an incomplete assignment of property rights within the integrated firm, may 
provide an advantage for arm’s length relationships. Additionally, the existence of a 
sufficiently competitive upstream market where firms may access intermediate inputs 
and raw materials at relatively low prices may lure more and more firms to choose 
outsourcing, with a remarkable bandwagon effect driving this process. If this effect is 
strong enough, then firm idiosyncratic levels of vertical integration within a given 
industry are unlikely to obtain at the equilibrium (see McLaren, 2000; Grossman and 
Helpman, 2002, 2005; Antras and Helpman, 2004; see also Yeats, 1998, for an 
empirical assessment on the significance of outsourcing and global production 
sharing). 
On the other hand, it is by now part of the acquired wisdom that vertical integration 
can be  considered as a remedy to the well known hold-up problem, with particular 
reference to situations where vertically related firms must rely on incomplete contracts 
to trade intermediate inputs whose quality (or performance) is unobservable and 
requires costly investments (Williamson, 1971; Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
Several other factors may of course intervene to make the picture even more 
complicate, such as technological shocks, market integration, the co-existence of firms 
with different goals, and so on. 
In this paper we examine one of these extensions, and propose a very simple 
theoretical model  predicting that different outcomes can emerge when firms with 
different objective functions compete in an oligopoly market. In particular, we take 
into consideration a duopoly model in which a standard profit-oriented firm competes à 
la Cournot with a managerial firm, in the market for the final good. The production of 
the final good requires, on a one-to-one basis, an intermediate input which can be 
either made in house by the downstream firms or bought from a monopolistic upstream 
                                                 
1 For an exhaustive account of the earlier literature on vertical integration, see Perry (1989). 
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firm. We characterise the optimal choice of firms as to the make-or-buy alternative, 
and prove that the equilibrium outcome is sensitive to the relative size of the market for 
the final good and the fixed cost of production associated to the intermediate input. In 
particular, our analysis shows that if the fixed cost required by the production of the 
intermediate input is low enough, then making the input in house is a dominant 
strategy for both firms, while otherwise the profit-seeking unit prefers outsourcing, 
giving thus rise to an industry with a mixed industry structure where vertical 
integration and outsourcing do coexist at equilibrium. By contrast, vertical integration 
is always socially preferable to outsourcing in view of its beneficial effect on the 
equilibrium price of the final good and therefore on consumer surplus. 
Note that in the present paper we confine ourselves to a partial equilibrium framework. 
Of course, a general equilibrium perspective could lead to different conclusions and 
policy prescriptions (see, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, on the relationship between 
outsourcing and wage inequality in the globalized world; Arora and Gambardella, 2006 
and Bianchi et al., 2006 for recent analysis of the role of outsourcing  in the “old” and 
“new” industrial policy). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the layout of the model. 
Section 3 focuses on a comparative assessment of the alternative equilibria and a 
selection among them. Section 4 contains a few concluding comments. 
 
2. The structure of the model 
 
We consider a situation in which two firms, 1 and 2, compete on the market of a final 
good characterised by the following inverse demand function: 
 
,0,)1( >−= aQaP  
 
Firms compete under complete and symmetric information à la Cournot, 
simultaneously setting the amount of production, 1q  and 2q  respectively. 
Firm 1 is assumed to be managerial; in particular, following Vickers (1985), we 
assume that the managers aim at maximising a weighted average of profit and 
production, while the owners are able to write the contract for managers in such a way 
that the managerial incentive is “optimally” set so as to maximise their firm’s profits. 
Firm 2 is a standard profit-oriented firm. Hence, the objective function of the firms 
during the market subgame are, respectively: 
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where iπ  (i=1,2) denotes profits (that is, the difference between revenues and operative 
costs Ci); variable t  (in eq. (2)) measures the managerial incentive, which has to be 
appropriately chosen by the firm’s owners.   
The production of one unit of output q requires one unit of an intermediate input, that 
can be either (i) produced by the same firms, or (ii) bought in the upstream input 
market. Its production entails a fixed cost k and a marginal cost of production c>0, 
irrespective of whether it is produced by firm 1 and/or 2 internally, or outsourced.  
However, in the latter case, its unit price is w>0.  
This means that production cost under the case in which firm(s) 1 and/or 2 decide to 
make it (make-option)  is 
 
2,1,0,)4( =>+= ickcqC iim  
 
while the cost function under the buy-option is 
 
2,1,)5( == iwqC iib  
 
If the intermediate good is produced by a different firm (called firm U, standing for 
upstream), we assume that such a firm enjoys a monopoly power in the upstream 
market and sets the unit price w in order to maximise its profits.2 
The stage-by-stage sequence of decisions along the time line of the game is represented 
in figure 1. 
 
                                                 
2 For a model where downstream firms face a competitive upstream market, see Garvey and Pitchford 
(1995). 
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Figure 1. - The timing of decisions 
 Stage:  1      2          3  
 
 
At stage 1, the owners of firm 1 determine the incentive coefficient t; this variable has 
an “institutional” flavour, so that it is natural to assume that it is fixed at the outset. 
At stage 2, the monopolistic firm (possibly) producing the intermediate input sets the 
unit price of its product; the price is set optimally in order to maximise profits, and 
looking ahead at the demand expressed by one or both firms operating in the market 
for the final good. 
At stage 3, the duopolistic downstream firms noncooperatively and simultaneously 
choose their respective output levels, in order to maximise their objective functions. 
We evaluate the results for firms and consumers, in the four cases corresponding to the 
choice of making or buying the intermediate input by each downstream firm. This 
amounts to saying that the decision on whether making or buying the input is taken at 
stage 0, and entails an irreversible commitment. 
 
3. Solving subgames 
 
3.1 Both firms make the intermediate input 
 
We start by considering the case in which both firms decide to produce the intermediate 
input. This case is denoted by the m (make) or mm (make-make) appearing at the 
superscript of the relevant functions and  variables. As usual, the game is solved by 
subgame perfection obtained through backward induction. 
At the last stage of the game, firm 1 faces the problem: 
 
Managerial  
incentive t 
is set by the 
shareholders of 
firm 1
Price w 
set by firm U 
producing the 
intermediate  
input
Production 
levels 
q1, q2 
are chosen by 
firms 1 and 2
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while firm 2 solves the following problem: 
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The first order conditions, 0/,0/ 2211 =∂∂=∂∂ qVqV mm give the reaction function 
system, whose intersection yields the Cournot-Nash equilibrium output levels:  
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The above expressions depend on the reservation price, parameter a, the marginal cost 
c, and t, which is perceived as given at this stage of the game. Notice in particular that 
the delegation extent, t, affects not only the level of production of the managerial firm, 
but also the production of his opponent, who finds it optimal to reduce the production as 
a reaction to the output expansion undertaken by firm 1, as it is usually observed in a 
Cournot market game with substitute goods. 
In this case, no decision has to be taken by the firm producing the intermediate input, 
since it does not face any positive demand for its product. 
Substituting the values of q1mm and q2mm in the profit function of firm 1 and simplifying, 
one may write the profit function of firm 1, and then select the value of t maximising it. 
This procedure yields the optimal extent of strategic delegation: 
 
.4/)()9( cat mm −=  
 
In turn, it is immediate to find the corresponding value for individual production levels, 
profits, consumer surplus and social welfare (defined as the sum of firms’ profits and 
consumer surplus): 
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As expected, the firm whose owners delegate to a manager the decision about 
production can gain a higher profit with respect to a standard profit-seeking 
(entrepreneurial) firm, thanks to the expansion in the production level. This result is 
well known from the pioneering work of Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd 
(1987), inter alia. 
Note also that a (simple) parametric condition must be imposed on k, in order to ensure 
positive profits for both firms, i.e., k< 2)( ca − /16. 
 
3.2 Both firms buy the intermediate input 
 
If both firms commit themselves to buy the intermediate input, they face the following 
maximum problems: 
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From the first order conditions, which are omitted for the sake of brevity, we derive the 
Nash equilibrium at the market stage, as follows:  
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Also in this case,  the managerial coefficient affects the choice of both the managerial  
firm and his  opponents, in opposite directions. 
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The expressions appearing in system (13) also provide the total amount of the 
intermediate input to be bought from the upstream firm, provided that the input 
requirement is supposed to be one unit of input per unit of output. 
Hence, the firm producing the intermediate input (firm U) faces the following profit 
function: 
 
,))(()14( 21 kqqcw
bbbbbb
U −+−=π  
 
where w is the market price of the intermediate input, whose production entails in this 
case as well a fixed cost k and a marginal (constant) cost equal to c. 
As firm U enjoys monopoly power, it can set the price of its output in order to maximise 
profits (14); in particular, note that its profit function appears to be concave in w, once 
the firm, correctly anticipating the demand for its good deriving from the downstream 
firms, has plugged outputs (13) into (14). The optimal pricing rule for the upstream 
monopolist is then summarised by the following condition: 
 
.
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By substituting (15) in (13) and then (13) in the profit function of firm 1, one obtains  
 
144/)722)(522()16( 1 tcatca
bb +−−−=π  
 
which is concave in t. The value of t providing the maximum profit is then 
 
35/)(2)17( cat bb −=  
 
which measures – using the label suggested by Vickers (1985) – the optimal extent of 
the delegation of control to managers. 
As a last step, we are now able to compute the price of the intermediate input set by the 
upstream monopolist producing the intermediate input, the level of production chosen 
by the duopolistic firms in the market for the final consumption good and the 
corresponding profits, consumer surplus and social welfare (defined as the sum of the 
profits of three firms, and the consumer surplus in the market for the final good): 
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A straightforward comparison between expressions (10) and (18) produces a number of 
interesting insights.  
First of all, the levels of production of the final good are much lower in the case of a 
“buy” decision. Each firm shrinks its own production and consequently the aggregate 
production in the market of final good decreases of an amount equal to 
Qbb= ))(140/57( ca − . Hence, the associated decrease in consumers’ surplus amounts to 
2))(39200/8721( ca − . This means that consumers prefer a situation in which both firms 
decide to make the intermediate input, as compared to the situation in which both firms 
decide to buy it from the upstream monopolist. The economic intuition is as follows. In 
the buy-buy game, outsourcing entails (i) higher production costs for the final good, 
which bring about (ii) a decrease in aggregate output and clearly (iii) an increase in the 
equilibrium price. This chain of implications obviously implies that outsourcing 
ultimately hurts consumers. 
Second, the variation in individual profits for the firms producing the final goods may 
take both signs, depending on the size of k; however, the difference between the profits 
of the two firms is smaller in the case of buy-buy as compared to the make-make 
situation. 
Third, from a social perspective, 2))(39200/7239( cakSWSW mmbb −−=−  again may 
take both signs, depending on the relative size of k and 2)( ca − . 
 
 
3.3 The managerial firm makes the intermediate input while the profit-seeking one 
buys it 
 
In the mixed case in which the managerial firm decides to make the intermediate input 
internally while the standard neoclassical (profit-oriented) firm decides to buy it, the 
relevant objective functions are (6) and (12), respectively. The usual procedure to 
compute the first order conditions, to obtain the reaction functions, and then to compute 
the Nash equilibrium output levels leads to following result: 
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Also in this case, as one could expect from the outset, the extent of the managerial 
delegation positively affects the production level of the managerial firm, and negatively 
affects the production level of its opponent. More interestingly, the marginal production 
cost of the intermediate good, c, has a direct (and negative) effect on the production 
level of firm 1, and a  (direct) positive effect on the production level of firm 2. 
Moreover, the market price level of the intermediate good, w, has a (direct) negative 
effect on the level of production of firm 2 and a (direct) positive effect on the 
production level of firm 1. However, one has to take into account that the production 
cost c clearly affects the price of the intermediate input set by the monopolistic 
upstream firm, so that the whole effects are not clear-cut a priori. 
Note that  q2mb in (19) also represents the demand function for the intermediate input 
faced by firm U, whose objective turns out to be 
 
.3/)2)(())(()20( 2 kwtcacwkqcwMax
mbmb
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The solution of firm U’s maximum problem is  
 
4/)3()21( tcawmb −+=  
 
Needless to say, the comparison between the levels of the input price provided by (18) 
and (21) is not a straightforward one, due to the fact that the upstream monopolist 
producing the intermediate input faces a different demand function in the case in the 
two alternative settings, with the inequality depending upon parameters a and c, as well 
as variable t. Of course, the effect of t on the input price is negative, since a higher 
extent of delegation entails a higher production for firm 1, and correspondingly a lower 
one for firm 2, which ultimately means that there will be a lower demand for the 
intermediate input provided by firm U. 
The optimal value for t can be computed maximising the profits of firm 1. By 
substituting (21) into (19), and then (19) into (6), one finds that the profits of firm 1 in 
this case are 
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from which it is immediate to find the optimal value of t, i.e.,  
 
7/)()23( cat mb −=  
 
Then, substituting (23) back into all of the relevant variables and simplifying, one can 
fully characterise the equilibrium outcome of this setting: 
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Interestingly enough, in this “mixed” situation, where firm 1 makes the intermediate 
input in house, while firm 2 buys it, firm 1 ends up producing the same amount of final 
good as in the case in which both firms make the input, and firm 2 produces the same 
amount of final good as in the case in which both firms buy the input. Thus, the 
aggregate production level of the final good lies between the cases in which both firms 
adopt the same decision whether to  buy or make the intermediate input. 
The viability condition in this setup consists in requiring that the equilibrium profits of 
the managerial firm be positive, i.e., mb1π . This is equivalent to imposing that 
k<5 2)( ca − /28. This obviously suffices to ensure that mbSW >0 as well. 
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3.4 The managerial firm buys the input while the entrepreneurial one makes it 
 
If firm 1 buys the intermediate input while his opponent decides to make it, firms’ 
objective functions are defined as in (11) and (7), respectively. The Nash equilibrium at 
the market stage is: 
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The qualitative properties of system (25), as far as the influence of a, c, t and w on 
output levels is concerned, are largely the same as in the previous cases. 
Considering that  q1bm in (25) represents the demand function for the intermediate input, 
the goal of firm U now writes: 
 
.3/)22)(())(()26( 1 kwtcacwkqcwMax
bmbm
Uw
−−++−=−−=π  
 
The solution is  
 
4/)23()27( tcawbm ++=  
 
In this case, in which the managerial firm buys the input, the higher the delegation 
extent t, the higher the price of the intermediate input. The intuitive explanation for this 
fact is that delegation makes the managerial firm richer as well as bigger than its rival; 
under full information, this feature is exploited by the upstream monopolist by driving 
the input price upwards. 
Variable t can be computed taking into account profit of firm 1 once (27) is substituted 
in (25), and then in the profit function, which can be rewritten as:  
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The above expression takes its maximum in correspondence of 8/)( cat −−= , and is 
decreasing in t for all positive values of t. This means that the optimal extent of 
delegation is tbm=0 (that is, we explicitly exclude the possibility of writing output-
reducing delegation contracts). The economic  interpretation is very simple, as the 
owners of firm 1 are aware that managers find it optimal to expand the output (and 
13 
therefore also the demand for the intermediate input which has to be bought in the 
market). This leads to lower profits if the intermediate input is outsourced. Accordingly, 
shareholders find it optimal to set the output expansion incentive to zero, entailing that 
the managerial firm indeed mimics the behaviour of a pure profit-seeking enterprise. 
Substituting t=0 back into all the relevant variables and simplifying, we obtain 
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Here, the viability condition for the above equilibrium outcome to be admissible is 
bm
2π >0, or equivalently k<25 2)( ca − /144. In this case, the profit of firm 2 is larger than 
her opponent’s, for all 2))(48/7( cak −< . Note that this is necessarily the case, as the 
latter condition is milder than the viability condition. 
Consumers surely prefer the opposite situation where firm 1 makes and firm 2 buys 
rather than the present one. This is motivated by the fact that the managerial firm is free 
to expand output when the intermediate input is made in house, and this factor has an 
obvious effect on aggregate output. 
 
 
3.5 Comparison 
 
Table 1 provides a detailed overview of the foregoing analysis, concerning equilibrium 
outputs, downstream firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social welfare. 
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Table 1 – A summary of equilibrium outcomes 
 mm bb mb bm 
1q  2/)( ca −  5/)( ca −  2/)( ca −  6/)( ca −  
2q  4/)( ca −  7/)( ca −  7/)( ca −  12/)(5 ca −  
1π  kca −−
8
)( 2
 
35
)( 2ca −
 kca −−
28
)(5 2
 
36
)( 2ca −
 
2π  kca −−
16
)( 2
 
49
)( 2ca −
 
49
)( 2ca −
 kca −−
144
)(25 2
 
CS  2)(
32
9 ca −  2)(
1225
72 ca −  2)(
392
81 ca −  2)(
288
49 ca −  
SW  
kca 2)(
32
15 2 −−  kca −− 2)(
1225
348
 kca 2)(
392
171 2 −−  kca 2)(
288
119 2 −−  
 
From the consumers’ standpoint, the best situation is the case in which both firms 
decide to make the input, followed by the case in which only the managerial makes, 
followed in turn by the case  where only the profit-oriented firm decides to make. The 
worst situation is that where both firms decide do to buy. This is motivated by the fact 
that outsourcing by the entire industry ultimately involves the highest market price for 
the final good. This is summarised by 
 
Lemma 1. CSmm> CSmb> CSbm> CSbb always. 
 
Now take the social perspective. A quick inspection of the equilibrium social welfare 
levels in the four alternative settings reveals: 
 
Proposition 2. For all k< 2)( ca − /16, SWmm> SWmb> SWbm> SWbb. 
 
That is, provided the fundamental viability condition is met, then social preferences 
fully reflect the ranking of consumer surplus levels stated in Lemma 1.3 Note that 
Proposition 2 implies a non-trivial result, i.e., that the situation where one fixed cost  is 
saved because of a generalised industry outsourcing decision, is not as appealing as it 
might look ex ante. That is, avoiding the duplication of the fixed component of the input 
cost is not a desirable achievement per se, since it involves the undesirable effect of 
inducing a price increase in the market for the final good. In other words, the make-
make decision, even if entails fixed costs’ duplication, turns out to be socially preferable 
to alternative situations where such a duplication does not occur, since it entails a larger 
level of final output and hence a higher consumer surplus. 
 
                                                 
3 The condition whereby SWbm> SWbb is k < 0.284 2)( ca − , which is surely met if k < 2)( ca − /16. 
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There remains to investigate the strategic interplay between firms 1 and 2 when it comes 
to choose whether to make or buy the input. Table 2 illustrates the reduced form of the 
make-or-buy game, from the downstream firms’ viewpoint. 
 
Table 2. The make-or-buy game between downstream firms 
                                   Firm 2 
Firm 1 
               M                       B    
M 
kca −−
8
)( 2
;     kca −−
16
)( 2
 kca −−
28
)(5 2
;       
49
)( 2ca −
 
B 
36
)( 2ca −
;        kca −−
144
)(25 2
 
35
)( 2ca −
;              
49
)( 2ca −
 
   
 
Maintaining the hypothesis that the game is played once and firms are cannot bear 
negative payoff on this market, i.e., k < 2)( ca − /16, we see that M is always a strictly 
dominant strategy for the managerial firm (firm 1), while it is a strictly dominant 
strategy for the entrepreneurial firm (firm 2) as well if and only if k < 0.042 2)( ca − . 
Outside this parameter range, up to k < 2)( ca − /16, firm 2 prefers to buy if firm 1 
makes, while it prefers to make if firm 1 buys. Note that, in the latter case, the 2x2 
matrix can be reduced by deleting the second row (due to the fact that M is dominant for 
firm 1); this allows us to conclude that, on what remains of the original matrix (the top 
row), B is dominant for firm 2, for all )16/)(,)(042.0( 22 cacak −−∈ . Accordingly, we 
can state: 
 
Proposition 3. For all k < 0.042 2)( ca − , (M,M) is the unique Nash equilibrium (in 
weakly dominant strategies). For all ),16/)(,)(042.0( 22 cacak −−∈  (M,B) is the 
unique Nash equilibrium (attainable by iterated dominance). 
 
In words, this amounts to saying that for low levels of fixed cost of production the 
unique equilibrium entails that both firms choose to make the input in house. For higher 
levels of fixed costs, the equilibrium entails that the managerial firm produces the input 
in house while the profit-oriented firm resorts to outsourcing.  
Propositions 2-3 immediately imply the following relevant corollary: 
 
Corollary 4. For all k < 0.042 2)( ca − , there is no conflict between private and social 
incentives as to the make-or-buy decision. A conflict instead arises for all 
),16/)(,)(042.0( 22 cacak −−∈  where (M,M) is socially preferred while (M,B) is 
privately selected. 
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A few comments are now in order. First, the option to buy the input (i.e., outsourcing) 
becomes attractive for the profit-seeking unit if the fixed cost is high enough, while it is 
never so for the managerial firm. The intuitive reason appears to be that strategic 
delegation makes a firm richer than it would be otherwise (all else equal) and therefore 
more keen on resorting to vertical integration no matter what the cost is, while the 
entrepreneurial unit is weaker (or, equivalently, poorer) and therefore more sensitive to 
any given increase in the cost of the upstream technology. This gives rise to the 
possibility of observing a divergence between private and social incentives as to the 
make-or-buy choice, given that vertical integration of the entire industry is always 
socially preferable to any other scenario because of its desirable consequences on 
consumer surplus.  
Second, a related issue is that the arising of such a conflict opens a discussion on 
industrial policy instruments, as the conflict itself could be avoided by subsidising the 
profit-seeking firm so as to induce it to internalise the production of the input 
notwithstanding its high fixed-cost component. The appropriate amount of resources to 
be redirected to the profit-seeking firm as a subsidy could be raised (either alternatively 
or jointly) from taxes levied on consumers and/or from the profits accruing to the 
managerial firm. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
We have modelled a Cournot duopoly where a profit-seeking firm and a managerial one 
coexist and must choose whether to make or buy an intermediate input which 
contributes to the production of the final consumption good. 
The situation has been represented by a simple three-stage game. At the first stage, each 
firm has to commit herself either to produce in house the input or to buy it on the 
market. Then, the other choices are taken: in turn, the owners of the managerial firm set 
the managerial incentive; the independent upstream firm producing the input sets its 
price; each duopolist sets her production level. The game has been solved by backward 
induction, yielding several interesting results (under the assumption that the parameter 
constellation allows both firms to obtain positive profits). 
Taking a partial equilibrium perspective, we have shown that consumers always prefer  
the situation in which  both firms choose in-house input production. This is also the best 
outcome from a social welfare perspective at the market level. Unfortunately, this is the 
equilibrium choice of firms only under a specific parameter configuration; if such a 
parameter condition is not met, a conflict arises between private and social preferences. 
However, the divergence could be eliminated, in principle, by designing an appropriate 
subsidy scheme for the profit-seeking firm.    
Two remarks are appropriate to conclude, as a note of caution, and as insights for 
possible future research. First, we have maintained the hypothesis that the costs of in 
house production of the input permit the duopolistic firms to obtain positive profits. Of 
course, the story could well go a different way, if a firm were forced to resort to 
outsourcing. Second, our analysis has been carried out in a partial equilibrium 
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framework. Of course, different policy implications could emerge if a more general 
perspective were adopted. 
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